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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the key tenets of the Washington Consensus view of economic policy making is that investment climate reform -that is improvements in 'the institutional, policy and regulatory environment in which firms operate' 1 -lead to discernible improvements in firm performance and consequently, an increase in economic growth. There has been a large empirical literature that is adduced to support the proposition that investment climate reform can lead to productivity improvements and higher economic growth. Several studies in this literature show that various indicators of a poor investment -such as power supply interruptions, high regulatory burden in the form of time firm management spend with government inspectors, corruption, and poor access to finance -have a negative effect on firm productivity and growth. 2 Recommendations to reform the investment climate are now an indispensable component of the standard policy advice that World Bank and the IMF offer to developing countries.
The Washington Consensus proposition that investment climate reform can lead to higher productivity and overall growth has not been without its critics. There have been two main sets of criticisms levelled at the investment climate literature. Firstly, as Moore and Schmitz (2008, p. 10) argue, "the core conceptual problem with (the) orthodoxy is that government and political power are viewed primarily as persistent threats to capital, investment and economic growth. From that perspective, the policy mission is to curtail the influence of political power through formal rules, laws and institutions. If that mission fails, politicians are expected at least to maltreat the private economy, and possibly to loot it, and thus, undercut economic growth."
Thus, there is a strong assumption in the literature that the state, by its very nature, is always predatory, and cannot be developmental in most instances of its manifestations. This is contrary to an alternate view that takes the position that 'good growth-enhancing relations between business and government elites are possible' (Maxfield and Schneider 1997, Harriss 2006) . That collaborative state-business relations can be growth-enhancing has been reflected in a long-standing literature in political science and in political economy (e.g., Amsden 1989 , Evans 1995 .
A second criticism of the investment climate literature is that it confuses cause and effect by focusing on the outcomes of effective state action, rather than the underlying structural factors that determine these outcomes (Carlin et al. 2008 (Moore and Scmitz 2008) . This again in our view is due to the possibility that investors are more interested in the state's overall commitment to growth oriented outcomes, and that the latter may over-ride certain weaknesses in the investment climate such as insecurity of formal property rights and high degrees of corruption.
In this paper, we dig deeper into the determinants of better investment climate outcomes by focusing on their underlying causes, which we argue are effective state business relations. In our view, a synergistic relationship between the state and the business sector, which is based on strong and well organised states and private sector associations, is more likely to lead to the provision of public goods such as roads and electricity, and a lower regulatory burden on the private sector. In the next section, we argue why this is the case, and why effective state business relations may improve firm performance, and hence, overall economic welfare. 3 In the Indian case, a handful of studies have examined the relationship between investment climate and economic performance at the sub-national level using firm or industry data (Dollar et al., 2002; Veermani and Goldar, 2004; and World Bank, 2004) . These studies find that states with better investment climate plays a significant role in productivity growth. 4 Dollar et al. (2002) examine the effects of standard investment climate variables on firm productivity across states in India and find that less reliable power supply and inferior internet connectivity in poor investment climate states account for a quarter of the TFP differences across states and that a tenth of the differences reflect greater regulatory burden in the same states. Using a more expanded sample of firms which includes Bangladesh, China and Pakistan, Dollar et al. (2005) obtain similar results.
II. WHY DO EFFECTIVE STATE-BUSINESS RELATIONS MATTER FOR FIRM PERFORMANCE?
The literature on state-business relations takes the following elements as essential characteristics of effective state-business relations (see Maxfield and Schneider (1997) , Chapter 1).
 Transparency: the flow of accurate and reliable information, both ways, between business and government.
 Reciprocity: the capacity and autonomy of state actions to secure improved performance in return for subsidies. Finally, effective state-business relations and membership of business association may help to reduce policy uncertainty. Firms operate in an uncertain environment and frequently face risk and resource shortages. They undertake decisions concerning technology, inputs, and production facilities based on anticipated market conditions and profitability. Uncertainty can have significant negative effects on investment, when investment involves large sunk and irreversible costs and there is the option to delay the decision to make the investment until further information becomes available (Dixit and Pindyck 1994) . Businesses that have a better relation with government may be able to anticipate policy decisions.
Hisahiro (2005) argues that various forms of information and resources, which are dispersed among entities in the public and private sector, need to be integrated in a more sophisticated way to jointly coordinate policies and provide better public services. It is this combination of insulation and connectedness that minimises the risks and enhances the effectiveness of economic policies. Hence, appropriate government capacity and policy, which is necessary to support private sector development and promote economic growth, can be enabled by good state-business relations and productive public-private sector dialogue.
Thus, effective state-business relations can enhance firm performance by positively affecting the two proximate determinants of firm growth -the rate of factor accumulation and the growth of total factor productivity. Greater transparency in the flow of information between state actors and the business sector leads both to a better allocation of investments by the business sector to their most productive uses and, by reducing policy uncertainty in the minds of investors, a higher rate of investment.
Higher credibility of state actions lead to less problems of time and dynamic inconsistency of government policies, providing a more favourable environment for investment to occur. Reciprocity ensures improved performance by private sector actors in return for subsidies and the provision of public goods, contributing to higher productivity growth.
In summary, effective state-business relations can mitigate both market failures and government failures which are pervasive in most developing countries, and by doing so, bring about an increase in the performance of firms.
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III. MEASURING STATE BUSINESS RELATIONS IN INDIA
Te Velde (2006) was the pioneering study to develop measures of SBRs quality. He
argues that an SBR index should have four components, which reflect the main aspects of effective SBRs: 1) the way in which the private sector is organised vis-à-vis the public sector;
2) the way in which the public sector is organised vis-à-vis the private sector;
3) the practice and institutionalisation of SBRs;
4) the avoidance of harmful collusive behaviour between the two sectors.
Each of the aspects mentioned above is captured through a SBR sub-index which in turn is derived from data on variables reflecting the mentioned aspects. The various SBR sub-indices are then combined to arrive at an overall index of SBR. CMP measure SBR along the above four dimensions for 15 Indian states using both primary and secondary data. We describe below the manner CMP operationalise the measurement of SBR in India.
The role of the private sector in SBR
CMP measure the role of the private sector via the quality and effectiveness of the umbrella business association and two sector based business associations, as follows: (1) or neutral (0). In this way they produce a yearly cumulative index which may proxy for the relative effectiveness of the mentioned aspect of SBR. The argument is that more effective SBRs would allow employers to be more influential affecting on government policies and would get reflected in more pro-employer labour market regulation.
b) Stamp Duty:
As a measure of distortionary taxation at the state level, we use the level of stamp duty over time. There are three separate weighting processes involved in the construction of the SBR index. First, those private sector variables for which data are available for the mentioned three associations in each state need to be weighted to generate an aggregate private sector variable. CMP have experimented with different types of weights to limit the degree of subjectivity in this weighting decision, thus effectively generating different variants of the variables. While CMP used different weighting procedures in the construction of the SBR private variable, we use the weighting procedure where the apex business association is assigned a value of 0.5 and the two sectoral associations are assigned a value of 0.25 each.
Mechanisms to avoid collusive behaviour
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In Figure 1 , we present the period averaged SBR measures for 1994-2000 and 2001-2005 . As is clear, there are strong differences in the effectiveness of state business relations across Indian states. These differences seem to have persisted over time. at the unit level. The data are in the form of repeated cross-sections, and not panel data. This is because the CSO do not reveal the identity of the firm/plant in the unit record data.
Methodology
Our variable of interest is the measure of state-business relations that we described in Section III and its effect on total factor productivity (TFP). To test the effect of SBR on TFP, we run augmented production functions as follows:
Where i is industry, s is state and j is firm.
Y is gross value added, K is capital stock, L is total number of employees, SBR is our measure of state business relations, δ i are industry fixed effects and e is the error term.
We would expect that a 3 is positive and significant -i.e., more effective SBR (as captured by higher SBR score) should lead to improved total factor productivity.
The industry fixed effects capture industry-specific differences in technology which would be correlated with TFP. They also capture other industry specific differences which would affect TFP such as differences in market structure and trade orientation. We first estimate equation (1) using Ordinary Least Squares, and with robust heteroskedasticity constant standard errors. However, it is possible that unobserved technology shocks may be correlated with both, capital stock and output, leading to a bias in estimate of a 1 . In order to correct for this, we also estimate equation (1) using two-stage least squares with materials as an instrument for capital stock. Col. (4) and (5), we include industry dummies with no significant change in the results. To correct for the possible endogeneity bias associated with production function estimation, we estimate the equation using instrumental variable (IV)
V. RESULTS
method. The results of this IV exercise with industry dummies are reported in Col. (6) and (7). We find that the coefficient on the SBR variable is positive but not significant for the year 2000-01 while the coefficient value remained significant for the year 2004-05.
In Table 3 , we re-do the IV analysis for the different components of our SBR measure. We want to examine whether our finding is driven by specific dimension of SBR measure. We find that SBR private and practice components have a positive and significant effect on TFP for 2004-05. We also find SBR collusive component has a similar effect on TFP but for 2000-01. However, SBR public seems to have a negative and significant effect on TFP for the year 2000-01. This latter finding may possibly reflect the fact that setting up of corporations by the state and public expenditure on economic sectors has not led to the provision of high quality public goods that matter for private sector performance. Nevertheless, it is clear that SBR private, practice and collusive dimensions of the overall SBR measure have contributed to the overall positive impact of effective SBR on firm performance. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS
It is commonly argued that a better investment climate reform -that is, lower distortions in the institutional, policy and regulatory environment in which firms operate -lead to discernible improvements in firm performance. In this paper, we argue that effective state business relations condition better investment climate outcomes and that the deeper institutional determinants of firm performance are the former. We examine the effect of effective state-business relations of total factor productivity (TFP) for formal manufacturing sector firms in India for the years 1994-95 and 2000-01, and find support for this hypothesis. We find a positive effect of state-business relations on TFP of the formal manufacturing sector.
